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Towards an Alloiostrophic Rhetoric 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This essay offers the exigence and outlines a strategy for theorizing 
“alloiostrophic rhetoric” and the practices and possibilities of such a theory. In brief, 
alloiostrophic rhetoric is one that turns towards difference, diversity, and the other. We 
explore such questions as the following: Why is a theory of alloiostrophic rhetoric 
needed? What are its primary characteristics? How might alloiostrophic rhetoric be 
performed?  
As the preposition towards in our title indicates, this essay is, by necessity, a 
sketch. The necessity arises, in part, from the scarce historical resources of this trope, 
alloiostrophos, and in part from a received tradition—dominated by attention to 
metaphor—that fails to imagine how to write, speak, and perform alloiostrophically. This 
latter point we take up momentarily. As for the former, alloiostrophos is not a trope that 
the history of rhetoric recognizes. Despite its presence in Liddell, Scott, and Jones (LSJ 
1996, 69-70) as both “alloiostrophos” and “alloiotropos,” this figure cannot be found 
anywhere in the rhetorical tradition, not anywhere from Aristotle to Kenneth Burke, nor 
in any handbooks on rhetoric whether in antiquity or contemporary times.1 Yet the term 
resides in its adjectival form in the ancient Greek lexicon. We take this as an invitation to 
theorize. The scarce textual record of this trope is not a constraint for us but an 
opportunity to imagine alloiostrophic rhetoric:  why it is necessary, what characteristics it 
displays, and how might it be performed. 
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Why Theorize Alloiostrophos? 
“My love is a red rose.” 2  Poets, rhetoricians, and tragedians could identify this 
expression as a metaphor.  Who could write, speak or perform an alloiostrophos?  As it 
turns out (according to Hephaestio and later commentators), Aeschylus, Aristophanes, 
and Sophocles wrote alloiostrophes.3 Yet, alloiostrophos is unexplored in the realm of 
rhetoric.  Worse yet it is structurally eclipsed by the privileged status of metaphor.   
From Aristotle’s privileging of metaphor as the means to bring ideas before the 
eyes (1994), to Kenneth Burke’s privileging of metaphor as the means of identification 
(1969a; 1969b), metaphor has held a primary position in rhetorical theory. This primacy 
of metphor does not seem capricious. As Hayden White (1978) explains it, metaphor is 
necessary to the process of understanding. Understanding in general is a metaphoric 
process rendering the unfamiliar familiar by asserting a similarity in a difference (5). 
Moreover, White observes that metaphor is even the master of the four master tropes. As 
he puts it, once recognizing the metaphoric character of understanding, “we may then 
distinguish metonymy and synecdoche, as secondary forms of metaphor…” (72).  
The primacy of metaphor does not go unnoticed. Paul Ricoeur (1977) goes so far 
as to say that in the rhetorical tradition tropological resources have been “progressively 
closed” to all but metaphor (45). Gérard Genette observes that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, metaphor alone survived the “great shipwreck of rhetoric and this 
miraculous survival is obviously neither fortuitous nor insignificant” (1982, 114).4  No 
one forecasts the primacy of metaphor more wryly than Wayne Booth:  “I have in fact 
extrapolated with my pocket calculator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more 
students of metaphor than people” (1978, 47).   
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 Whereas Ricoeur, Genette, and Booth all recognize the reduction of tropological 
resources to all but metaphor, we find Chaim Perleman and Luce Olbrechts-Tyteca 
(1969) to give a robust explanation of why this reduction is a problem. They note that the 
reduction of tropes to all but a few, especially metaphor, disregards the argumentative 
role of tropes. This is so because figures were not, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
note, “invented as ornaments” (167). To reduce the tropes is to limit the practice of 
argumentation precisely at the point of interaction between people and their use of 
language where choices and responsibility become articulated. Hence to reduce the tropes 
to all but metaphor reduces our freedom, responsibility, and choices.  
Moreover, the primacy of metaphor in rhetoric limits the space for difference. 
Metaphor inserts all that is familiar into difference, thereby making it difficult to make 
contact with difference as difference. In metaphoric systems, difference enters the realm 
of understanding in the form of the self-same. Such understanding is compounded by 
metaphor’s ubiquity which irresistibly draws difference into the form of the self-same. 
This ubiquity eclipses all the more an ability to make contact with difference as 
difference.  
By recognizing such problems with the primacy of metaphor, we find a need to 
bracket what Ricoeur calls metaphor’s “dictatorial position” (1977, 45) and expand 
awareness of the tropological resources for attending to difference. We need this figure of 
alloiostrophos to turn us towards difference and make an outside incursion into the 
regions eclipsed by metaphor. As outsiders, we can no longer, as Hélène Cixous and 
Catherine Clement write, continue to build rhetoric as the empire of the self-same (1986, 
78-93.  The future of rhetoric, speaking alloiostrophically as outsiders, requires that 
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rhetoric open itself up to a reconsideration of the tropes and the promise they hold for 
inventiveness, otherness, and difference.  
 
What Characteristics Does Alloiostrophos Display? 
With etymological play, we approach the question—what characteristics does 
alloiostrophos display. We see this word in two parts: strophos and strangeness. The 
“turn” of the strophos is defined by the “difference,” “diversity,” “alteration,” and 
“strangeness” of the alloîos (LSJ 1996, p. 69). This turn is less about a gesture of cultural 
sensitivity and more about the alteration of the very gesture. Insofar as the gesture of 
cultural sensitivity is prefigured by metaphor, it enacts a self-same turn, rendering the 
unfamiliar other familiar. The success of cultural sensitivity is cast in terms of charity or 
inclusion towards the other. In contrast, a strophic gesture defined by alloîos 
fundamentally alters the constitution of the self-same/other relation.  
In order to illuminate this alteration, we return to play with etymology, this time 
focusing on alloîos. Unlike alloiostrophos which does not exist in the received rhetorical 
tradition as a trope, alloiôsis does exist, yet not without marginalization. Quintilian 
includes alloiôsis as a figure (1921, 9.3.92) but unfortunately gives no examples. 
Renaissance rhetorical theorist Thomas Swynnerton (Rex 1999) lists alloiôsis fifth,5 after 
metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and irony, which of course are known today as the 
master tropes (Burke 1969a, 503-517). But despite Swynnerton’s scriptural references to 
alloiôsis, the trope, as Brain Vickers (2002) observes, has been largely forgotten or 
ignored by rhetoricians since the reformation (100).  
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Such a marginal position of alloîos as a trope of difference might call for a 
reclamation project, to excavate the material remains of alloiôsis to strengthen it as a 
trope of difference. In this manner, we would search for examples of alloiôsis. As much 
as we would like to explore this path, this manner of proceeding is problematic. We 
believe that theorizing alloiostrophos comes before finding examples of alloiôsis. 
Without a new way of seeing (ie. a new theory), any examples of alloiôsis we might find 
risk being understood only through the primacy of metaphor via an antistrophic rhetoric.  
In this essay our focus, therefore, is not on reclaiming alloiôsis for the rhetorical 
tradition but on theorizing a new turn for rhetoric, a new strophos, an alloiostrophos that 
would deviate from the normative strophos—antistrophos—upon which rhetorical theory 
is built. In his opening line, Aristotle uses the trope antistrophos to define rhetoric 
through dialectic (1354a). As we have argued elsewhere, this antistrophic theorizing is a 
catastrophe for rhetoric, for it favors the familiar, the metaphorical, and turns down 
difference (Sutton and Mifsud 2002).6 We were directed to the idea of catastrophe by 
Aristotle, when in Book 3 of the Rhetoric he writes that the style of rhetoric—as the 
antistrophos to dialectic—should be a catastrophic style. The catastrophic style means to 
turn (strophos) down (cata). For Aristotle, this turning down is equivalent to coming to a 
rest. This rest is commonly referred to as a period. We take the catastrophic style as 
implicative of a kind of argument.7 This argument aspires towards a conclusion. This 
conclusion is pleasurable because one comes to a rest—or period—rather than going on 
and on and on as in the running style (1409a.26-27).  
If we take a closer look at the catastrophic style, we notice something else. As the 
catastrophic or periodic style reaches an end, it does so through unreflective agreement. 
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This unreflective agreement is produced by the explicit expression of logical connectors. 
For example one would say, “I woke because I was thirsty,” rather than, “I woke, and I 
was thirsty.” The agreement secured here—“I woke because I was thirsty”—is a causal 
relation. The connector “because” hierarchically organizes two experiences—that of 
waking and of being thirsty. This explicit expression “because” imposes a particular 
conclusion.8 So while it may seem an exaggeration to say that this agreement is 
unreflective and diminishes freedom, choice, and responsibility, we hold true to this 
claim. We see at this mundane grammatical level an eclipse of the exigence of the 
imagination. Why imagine other possibilities of why one woke after a causal explanation 
of thirst is expressed?  
This example although perhaps appearing trivial shows much more of our core 
concern. That unreflective agreement secured at such a mundane grammatical level is a 
foundation of catastrophe, of turning down the other. In effect, the psychological impulse 
of the catastrophic periodic style is to turn our attention away from other possibilities. 
This distractive effect eclipses our ability to imagine something other, and manipulates 
our experience of differences. 
We enlarge our view of periodic style now, moving from the grammatical to the 
rhetorical level. Specifically we focus on the logical connection between rhetoric and 
dialectic that Aristotle establishes in his rhetorical theory, beginning with his opening 
line:  “Rhetoric is the antistrophe to dialectic.”9 In this line, through the figure 
antistrophe, Aristotle establishes a metaphoric relation between rhetoric and dialectic.  In 
his commentary The Rhetoric of Aristotle, E. M. Cope (1877) suggests as much “When 
applied in its strict and proper sense it [antistrophos] denotes an exact correspondence in 
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detail, as a facsimile or counterpart’ (2).” In our essay “Figuring Rhetoric,” we explain 
how Cope explores the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric:  “By ‘strict and proper 
sense,’ Cope is referring to the grammatical structure of SPN—subject plus a predicate 
nominative—as a ‘logic.’ So structured through antistrophos, rhetoric and dialectic then 
become ‘convertible,’ which is to say rhetoric and dialectic are ‘identical in meaning’ and 
‘precisely similar in all respect’”(Sutton and Mifsud 2002, 30-31). 
Not only is a metaphoric relation figured in this first line, it is figured so in a 
catastrophic style. The catastrophic style here is evinced by the use of the copulative 
“is.”10 Note that Aristotle follows this opening line by identifying only the similarities 
between rhetoric and dialectic, saying nothing of their differences. So from the start 
Aristotle “metaphorizes” rhetoric catastrophically through dialectic. This metaphoric 
rendering colonizes rhetoric’s difference and puts its theory in the service of the empire 
of reasoning ruled by dialectic.  
To return to Cixous and Clement’s critique of classical rhetoric, this building of 
the empire of the self-same forces “the orator . . . to unwind a thin thread, dry and taut” 
(1986, 93). In our previous examples of periodic style at both the grammatical and 
rhetorical levels, we experience performances of this thin thread, dry and taut, unwinding. 
This thread is a symbol of the line of meaning imposed by the catastrophic style. The 
thinness of the thread is an effect of the reductive quality of logical connectors—like 
“because”—and the copulative “is.” To speak catastrophically is to stay the threaded 
course, and avoid multiplicity and perhaps irrationality. As the orator unwinds this thin 
thread and makes it to the end, the orator, in Aristotle’s terms, achieves a pleasurable 
  
9 
resting place. Drawing from Cixous and Clement, we find this resting place akin to death, 
namely the death of difference. 
Affirming life, not only for difference but for rhetoric, we turn now to explore 
how the trope alloiostrophos enacts its turn towards difference. 
 
How Might Alloiostrophos Turn Towards Difference? 
We take our first clue from the ancient Greek lexicon. According to Liddell, 
Scott, and Jones (LSJ), alloiostrophos is “of the irregular strophes, i.e. not consisting of 
alternate strophe and antistrophe” (1996, 69).  Hence, alloiostrophos cannot move 
metaphorically as antistrophe can.  How then can it move?  We see it move 
metonymically. Whereas Hayden White, as we have earlier referenced, believes 
metonymy to be a mere subset of metaphor (reminiscent of Burke’s master tropes), we 
follow now Roman Jakobson (1971). Jakobson believes metonymy to be a distinct figure 
from metaphor. We see this distinction readily through rhetorical effect: with metaphor 
producing assimilation, for example, rendering two distinct phenomena the same; and, 
with metonymy producing association, for example, juxtaposing two phenomena 
rendering them distinct. In this section, we address the irregular movement of 
alloiostrophos as metonymical. We do so by juxtaposing the antistrophic and 
alloiostrophic movements.  
The antistrophic movement to the extent that it aspires to conclusion takes 
conclusion as its telos, and in its movement towards this telos turns down other 
possibilities. The alloiostrophic movement is an exertion towards other possibilities, and 
takes the recognition or imagination of other possibilities as its telos. The regular 
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movement of the antistrophic system is assimilative (metaphoric), where parts entering a 
whole lose their distinction for the greater good of the whole. The irregular movement of 
the alloiostrophic system is aggregative (metonymic), where parts entering a whole do 
not lose their distinction but exist side by side within a unity. This irregular movement 
transfigures the space of speech so that alterity can speak beyond the rule of metaphor. So 
alloiostrophic rhetoric turns to the complexity of possibility; therein lies its end, its telos.  
This presents a paradox, because in an antistrophic rhetoric the end is a resting place, 
whereas in an alloiostrophic rhetoric the end is a place of possibility.  
To illuminate this movement, we turn to the work of sociologist Saskia Sassen. In 
a November 2007 keynote address given at the Union for Democratic Communications 
Conference to an audience of international, interdisciplinary scholars and activists 
working towards the emancipation of communication systems and practices to enhance 
democracy, she used the example of the technology teacher and the citizens in a 
retirement home.11 We see in this example the crucial differences between the 
antistrophic and the alloiostrophic rhetorical movements. 
Though Sassen (2007b) never mentions rhetoric, nor seems to recognize the 
rhetorical movement at play in her example, we do. Sassen problematizes the received 
tradition, which we would call antistrophic, in which technology is brought to the 
members of a retirement home and the members of the community are to be drawn to that 
technology by the discourse. Technology teachers wish to make contact with elders so as 
to expand the reach of technology and to assimilate elders into the technological world. 
The teachers take as their end-point teaching elders to use e-mail, develop Web pages, 
blog, and so on. We recognize the antistrophic movement of their rhetoric, as the teachers 
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operate with a fixed telos defined from within the culture of technology. Their movement 
out to the elders is a way to bring these elders to the telos. As Sassen points out, this 
seems only on the surface a worthy movement, but its results are a catastrophe, where the 
lived experience of the elders is turned down as the multiplicity of their worlds is 
assimilated (metamorphized) into the unity of the technological world. Not only, as 
Sassen notes, are elders demoralized in the process of recognizing their worlds have been 
bypassed by technology, but this demoralization leads to a constrained ability for elders 
to learn.   
Sassen offers as an alternative approach, something that we see as alloiostrophic. 
She argues that technology teachers must approach the retirement home in a way other 
than the received tradition of teaching technology. Rather than operating from the fixed 
telos which arises from within the self-same technological system, the teacher must go 
out of this system to the multiple and diverse lived experiences of the elders and must 
attend to and deal with the complexity of their difference. So now the teacher is faced 
with the prospect of learning these other worlds—of the quilt maker, the beekeeper, the 
bridge player, the grandparent, and so on. When the teacher moves out towards these 
worlds and takes this as the beginning of teaching technology, and at the same time these 
worlds meet the technological from the particularities and idiosyncrasies of their lived 
experience, the multiple meetings enact the irregular and metonymical movement of 
alloiostrophos. So now the end of these meetings is not to subdue or catastrophize the 
other in the name of teaching technology; rather, the end becomes beginning points for 
creating something other than the colonizing power of technology on the one hand, and 
the marginalization of elders living without technology on the other.  
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In this example, we can see that both antistrophic and alloiostrophic rhetoric 
might be said to begin with a wish to make contact with the other. The antistrophic 
rhetoric wishes for a contact that would gain the adherence of interlocutors and secure 
their assent and mental cooperation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 16). 
Antistrophic contact prefigures the possibility of familiarity and the self-same. The 
alloiostrophic rhetoric wishes for a contact that would recognize and attend to the 
complexity of other possibilities as well as diversity and difference. So alloiostrophos is 
an irregular turn motivated by a wish to take us to other possibilities in a way that would 
permit contact without catastrophe. Alloiostrophos prefigures the possibility of alterity 
alongside of, rather than contesting or reducing the space of rhetoric with all its 
hierarchical privileges.  
So whereas the regularity of the antistrophic rhetoric is performed through a 
metaphor of similarity, the irregularity of alloiostrophic rhetoric is performed through a 
metonymy of difference. Whereas metaphor moves to a collective via an assimilation of 
difference into the self-same, a metonymy generates differences as an aggregate. As an 
aggregate, differences do not lose their distinction in the process of coming into a 
collective.12 As such, differences are related in apposition within an aggregate, that is to 
say differentiated from the other (Lily 1763, 172). In appositional relations, differences 
form an aggregate as a collective.  
Whereas antistrophic rhetoric is configured in the space of the agora, the public 
space for speech, alloiostrophic rhetoric is configured in the idiosyncratic and particular 
lived reality of alterity. In other words, we do not just have bodies to speak the phrase “I 
wake because I am thirsty,” but we are bodies. That makes all the difference. As such, the 
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retirement home and its community of citizens is not the space of alloiostrophic rhetoric. 
Rather, the space of alloiostrophic rhetoric is in the individual practices of the quilt 
maker, the beekeeper, the bridge player, the grandparent, and so on in their relation to 
technology. We note that this movement towards the space of the individual and the 
particular is the very movement that antistrophic rhetoric closes off. This is made evident 
to us in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1356b-1357a) as rhetoric is said to attend not to each 
person, not to Socrates or Callias as individuals, but to the general culture of people 
which the Greeks referred to as endoxa.13 
 Whereas the Sassen example shows how alloiostrophic rhetoric functions in 
rhetorical practice, we wish to explore as well how it functions in rhetorical theorizing. 
To what extent does alloiostrophic rhetoric re-theorize “rhetoric?” We claim that it does 
so by way of opening rhetorical space to individuals. We ask then, to what extent do we 
dare theorize a rhetorical space from an individual perspective rather than social? Given 
the rhetorical tradition, it might be better to ask, to what extent can we (dare) imagine 
such a space? Particularly rhetoric’s desire to become reconciled to dialectic casts the 
individual in dramatic terms of craziness, madness, and nonsense. This becomes 
particularly clear in the W. Rhys Roberts translation:  just as medicine does not theorize 
about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any 
or all of a given class of patients, in the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned with 
what seems probable to people of a given type, and this is true of dialectic also, 
“Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of haphazard materials, such as the 
fancies of crazy people  . . .”. And neither does rhetoric. So the fear of handing over the 
art of rhetoric to the individual ostensibly would invite anarchy, undermining the system 
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of civic discourse, just as handing over the art of dialectic to fancies of crazy people 
would undermine the system of rationality. This is how we understand Aristotle’s 
consistent eclipsing of the individual whether in his alignment of rhetoric with dialectic 
for their shared concern with things within the general ken, or the impossibility of 
building a theory on the particular.  
 It might be a surprise to Aristotle that advancements in medicine turn to the 
individual. This is evident in contemporary cancer treatments. Significant advances in 
medicine have indeed come by attending to what will cure Socrates’ and Callias’ cancer. 
New drugs are tailored to fit the individual. If we can entertain the idea of systematizing 
an art of medicine through individuals, we can do the same for rhetoric. Especially given 
rhetoric’s unique relation with the particular and its vast tropical resources, it seems 
reasonable to fashion a theory of rhetoric that does not turn down the individual but turns 
out to the individual.    
So the antistrophic system eclipses the individual, and the alloiostrophic system 
turns out towards the individual. Now to ask the question, are we suggesting a binary of 
these two forms of rhetoric:  the antistrophic and alloiostrophic? Are we suggesting a 
dissoi logoi between them as they figure the space of speech? Are we not setting up the 
alloiostrophos to win the debate? Not exactly in these terms. Yes, we have created a 
binary, but we wish to figure this binary through a metonymy of difference rather than a 
metaphor of similarity. The distinction lies in the latter assuming always an oppositional 
relation between the members of a set, where one member must be forced into the ruling 
power of the other. The metonymy of difference allows for distinction of members in a 
set without the metaphor of opposition. Instead this metonymy of difference frames the 
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members as appositional in the set. Given the figural reality of this appositional relation, 
we are working in an additive system of change, rather than a substitutive system, or a 
system of subtraction that violates the other by either turning down (subtracting) or 
forcing in (substituting).14 We can see that an appositional relation disrupts the 
catastrophe of the other. Rather than turning down the other, the other is added on, in a 
running style (eironomê), a rhetorical style Aristotle rejects (1409a.26-27). 
This forever perpetual appositional contact of the antistrophic and alloiostrophic 
movements keeps alive both spaces, as well as the need to alter them. This point of 
contact is an irritant for both spaces, with the alloiostrophos irritating the antistrophic 
enforcement of similarity, and antistrophos irritating the alloiostrophic turn towards 
rhetorical anarchy. In effect, neither one could fold or embed the other into itself for the 
appositional, not the oppositional, movements sustain indeterminacy of function or telos 
and so neither one can ever be fully itself.   
The juxtaposition of the antistrophic and alloiostrophic rhetoric offers a 
performance of an alloiostrophos. This in combination with our turn towards difference, 
namely our turn towards the anomaly of alloiostophos in the rhetorical tradition, allows 
us to offer our essay as a performance of what alloiostrophos can do to imagine 
difference. 
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1
 Our emphasis here is on the rhetorical tradition, knowing that alloiostrophos or words 
in the same declension are found in the Greek corpus. There is a technical use of 
àλλοιόστροφον at Hephaestio’s de poëmatis (69:15) located in Consbruch, ed. (1971), 
and available online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k25178s.  Especially 
noteworthy to the rhetorical tradition, as cited in Liddell, Henry George and Robert Scott 
and Sir Henry Stuart Jones, eds. 1968, 69 is the terms’ use in reference to poetic practices 
of Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Sophocles. 
2
 For further discussion of this example see Sutton and Mifsud (2002, 40-41). 
3
 See Note 1 above. 
4
 The “great shipwreck of rhetoric” to which Genette refers is a reference to the conflict 
between rhetoric and philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. 
5
 Swynnerton defines it this way: To be shorte, “Alleosis, is vnder one nature to 
vnderstande the other” (Rex 1999, 147). 
6
 For further discussion of antistrophe fusing rhetoric and dialectic, see Booth 2004, 
citing Sutton and Mifsud. 
7
 The position that style is implicative of a kind of argument draws from Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). See note 4 above. 
8
 For additional analysis see Mifsud (2007, 94-95). 
9
 For extended analysis see Sutton and Mifsud (2002). 
10
 The significance of the emergence of the copulative “is” grammar unique to fourth 
century language can be found in the following:  Kahn (2003); Havelock (1981), (1986). 
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11
 Saskia Sassen (2007b). This Keynote Address given at the International Conference of 
The Union for Democratic Communications is related to Sassen (2006), (2007a), (2007c), 
and (2008). 
12
 For additional commentary on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, see 
Jakobson (1971). 
13
 See Sutton and Mifsud (2002) for discussion of the exclusion of the individual (36-37).  
14
 See Sutton and Mifsud (2002, 37-39). 
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